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Introduction

In what follows, I will reflect on the importance of our conceptual dialogue with architecture. The reflection considers not only how we are in a conceptual dialogue with architecture that we are in the process of creating, but also how we conceptually relate to architecture that has already been thoroughly analyzed and described. In other words, the question that occupies the following reflection concerns not so much new, realized architecture or changes to already existing architecture, but whether a changed conceptual dialogue with architecture can contribute to our observing and understanding of aspects that we have not previously understood and been aware of. I am concerned with how a conceptual work as a *parallel creative activity* plays a role in the ambition to expand and enrich our understanding of, and learning from, architecture that has already been, or are in the process of being, created.

The claim is that it is decisive how we conceptually talk with architecture, as the concepts not only contribute to directing, but also creating attention. The reflection is motivated by climate changes and especially the biodiversity crisis and by the notion that it is crucial that we change our relationship with a nature that we– despite the best of intentions–are in the process of turning into a wasteland with our planning and architecture. There is simply a great deal that we have not paid attention to, and it is the thesis of the following reflection that the way we have historically conceptualized our world and its architecture is part of the problem. It is also the thesis that with attention to the trouble we can do something about it. But it requires reflection, a changed bodily engagement with a nature that is non-scalable (which is a crucial but often neglected fact; I will of course argue for this) *and* an active re-thinking of our conceptual dialogue with that nature, it's life forms and our architecture. That's the thesis I will try to motivate and examine.

Our body can do more than we know, our thought more than we are conscious of

Gilles Deleuze, in his presentation of Spinoza's practical philosophy, points out that "the most famous theoretical theses of Spinoza is known by the name of *parallelism*; it does not consist merely in denying any real causality between the mind and the body, it disallows any primacy of the one over the other" (Deleuze 1988:18). For Spinoza, our bodies can do more than we know, just as thought can do more than we are conscious of. Deleuze stresses that it is "by one and the same movement that we shall manage, if possible, to capture the power of the body beyond the given

conditions of our knowledge, and to capture the power of the mind beyond the given conditions of our consciousness" (Deleuze 1988:18). This awareness, for me, motivates a critique of Leonardo's *Vitruvian Man* and of Le Corbusiers *Modulor*, which both give the impression that the proper understanding of the human body is revealed where it is related geometric relations that are governed by a consciousness emphasizing the notion that proportionality is an underlying, essential truth of everything, thus not only of architecture, but also of nature. Rather than working with one overarching truth about bodies, our architecture and nature, controlled by consciousness, I am interested in the possibility of allowing different attentions to unfold in the investigation of unknown aspects of nature–and of architecture–by relating *on the one hand* to the power of a body beyond our prior knowledge of it and *on the other* to a parallel creative thinking with concepts that transcends already conscious conditions.

In other words, I agree with Elizabeth Grosz where she points out that in the past "it was through largely epistemological considerations that ontological hypotheses or claims have been directed and evaluated. If we know what there is, it makes sense that we come to what is through what we know" (Grosz 2017:3). It is my opinion that this approach very well characterizes traditional architectural theory, which has rather been concerned with setting standards for architecture in accordance with what we already know, than to facilitate an investigation of what we do not yet know. By reading Alberti's treatises I understand that he tries to establish a norm for art and architecture I can confirm with my consciousness, and it is–as already stated–my opinion that I am taught similar lessons when I relate to Leonardo's *Vitruvian Man* and to Le Corbusier's much later *Modulor*. But it is also my experience, in Grosz's words, that today with the biodiversity crisis it's impossible to neglect "that there are things that we do not know", and that it is crucial that we know how to change our tradition-bound attentions. We are heading towards an awareness that "what things are, how they connect with each other, what relations exist between them may be beyond our capacities for knowing at any moment in history" (Grosz 2017:3). However, this does not mean that we give up creating knowledge, but that "new forms of knowledge may be developed, new paradigms can emerge that may address what exists quite differently, even, perhaps, in incommensurable terms" (Grosz 2017:3).

It is part of my thesis that concepts of scale, which name relations with an emphasis on measure–and which thereby differ decisively from the size-independent proportional relations, which have been emphasized by a tradition which still imagined that ontology could be identified with an epistemology–can contribute to conceptually determining how architecture is embedded in an ontology, in a nature, that can't be identified with any epistemology. In the words of Bruno Latour, it is crucial that we do not subordinate scale concepts an unchanging meta-concept, since as concepts they are related to what we create experimentally with attention to more than we are aware of beforehand: "Scale is what is produced, not what you should have as your own metalanguage to describe it. Scale is the most variable thing to analyze–it is in the hands of actors because they constantly move scale" (Latour 2008:129). Philippe Boudon has similarly pointed out, that "scale does not exist" (Boudon 2009). Scale is what we produce when we relate–and name–different relations and are aware that "it matters what relations relate relations" in the words

of Donna Haraway (Haraway 2016:35). Boudon: "If scale does not exist, there must exist scales instead" (Boudon 2009). It is Boudon's and Latour's understanding that the way we with our architecture give measure to a world, that has no measure in itself and–as I have already stated and which will soon become clear–is non-scalable, depends on choices. And the choices of measurement relates to and are motivated by what we find relevant for the realization of our endeavours. The relevance of measurement is no longer a graduated ruler, but its relevance. It is a central point for Boudons Architecturologie that unlike geometry architecture has measures, which is why architecture is not scalable geometry; we give with our architecture measures to a non-scalable world which has no measure in itself and is much more than we will ever know (Boudon 2019).

It is my opinion that Latour's and Boudon's consideration are in dialogue with what Louis Kahn pointed out, where he expressed that "a great building must begin with the unmeasurable, must go through measurable means when it is being designed and in the end must be unmeasurable" (Kahn 1991). The architect must let her intuition, which belongs to what we cannot know in advance, involve 'measurable means', i.e. relationships we find relevant and physically necessary and can name with concepts of scale, in order to thereby realize what in the end is more than we can determine and measure. To conclude the mosaic of quotes from Grosz's inspiring reflection, I can approvingly emphasize with her that "while I do not consider what follows to be a critique of epistemology, I aim to bypass epistemological questions in favour of a focus on an ontology sensitive to and engaged with the realities of space and time, of events and becomings, not just things and their knowable, determinable relations" (Grosz 2017:4). Concepts of scale are created in an ontology, a nature, which remains more than we know of, but which we must give measure and inhabit wisely, which is a possibility precisely because we ourselves at any time are able to sense and think beyond given limits of consciousness. It is in that horizon that concepts of scale are necessary and can make sense also in the analysis of architecture from cultural history, which has not previously been analyzed with that understanding: Through a conceptual work we can learn something new from history that can have an impact on what we create tomorrow.

Nature isn't scalable

We have, Anna Tsing states, in modernity identified scaling and large-scale business with progress: "Scalability was progress" (Tsing 2012:514). Tsing exemplifies her claim with reference to the fact that capitalist realism, with its prioritization of profit and ever accelerating effectiveness, has had as an ideal to create plantations of one fast-growing type of trees or chicken farms, where the production of chickens and eggs can be both scaled up and made ever more efficient. But it is not about bigger trees and bigger chickens and eggs. It's about many trees of the same, fast-growing variety and many, many chickens and eggs in XL-farms. The 'problem' is that "scalability is not an ordinary feature of nature" (Tsing 2015:38). That fact sets certain limitations for growth capitalism cannot ignore, but these limits have apparently only been a further motivation for the creation of ever more efficient and bigger monocultures. We have moved from small to XL to semi-cite Rem Koolhaas; in planning of *Grand Paris* we

have to change to a bigger scale in order to create bigger structures according to the Dutch architects *MVRDV*. If there are limits to growth, we have found other growth opportunities. Progress must not be limited by physical restraints.

It is only in an abstract universe–in the world of drawings or computers–that we can zoom and thus arbitrarily enlarge and shrink what we are working with without changing anything other than the size of it. In the abstract world everything is scalable by will. The problem that manifests itself with architectural theory, and thus with the concepts we value when we talk about architecture, is that the possibility of scaling up and down, linked to the work with the drawing material, has been of decisive importance for what has been elevated to *the norm* for architecture. Or put another way: The idea that proportions should be in dialogue with the essence of architecture, as is characteristic of Alberti's architectural theory, which indicates that small (a room), large (a house) and XL (a city) should be equally proportioned, has promoted the idea that everything essential can be decided on the drawing board–or in the computer–and that what you draw can then be easily scaled up and realized. When Alberti demands that a building or a city must be finished on the drawing board without anything being changed afterwards, it is not because he is not aware that the drawing must be realized as a building or a city on a different scale, but because size and measure to him is almost irrelevant; Alberti did pay some attention to the size of the human body. More on that.

When Galileo in Venice, 150 years after Alberti's treatise on architecture, found out that a cube that is 10 in each side weighs not 10 but a thousand times more than a cube made of the same materials that is 1 in each side, he was put under house arrest. For Galileo, this was an explanation for why there are no scaled-up giants: their weight would mean that they would have to be constructed–and proportioned–quite differently from the *Vitruvian Man*, so that, for example, they would be able to support their own bodily weight with their legs. But for contemporary rulers it was unacceptable that everything in the physical world changes with size. The experience that "scalability is not an ordinary feature of nature" (Tsing) was unacceptable, because the abstraction–with an emphasis on proportions–tells us that size makes no difference and that the two cubes are identical (1:1:1=10:10:10=100:100:100….), despite their size. This proportional 'fact' has–apparenetly–made it easy to control everything, including architecture with our rational consciousness, and it should therefore not be challenged. We like being in control with our consciousness. Or we seem to become maladjusted when our bodies and thoughts tell us there is something we cannot control with our consciousness. And, what the heck, it was just the physical world and its inert matter that wasn't right and scalable; that we could change with our houses and cities, created in accordance with ideal principles of proportions for everyone to learn what truth and beauty are in essence.

It sounds perhaps like a caricature but is a relatively solid representation of what has been a prevailing attitude towards what we have perceived as 'inert matter' even in recent times. For Alberti architecture was a concern of the mind and "it is quite possible", he wrote, "to project whole forms in the mind without any recourse to the material" (Alberti 1988:7). According to the anthropologist Tim Ingold, Alberti's normative architectural thinking is exemplary of the *hylomorphism* that–rooted in the thinking of Plato and Aristotle–has characterized the Western World for the past

two Millenia. Ingold emphasizes that the *hylemorphism* is characterized by "an ontological claim, namely that things are constituted in the rational and rule-governed transposition of preconceived form onto inert substance" (Ingold 2010:93).

The question is whether Galileo's realization that everything changes with size in the physical world has become even more difficult to accept today, when scaling–monocultural largesse–has become the very definition of progress, as Tsing puts it. In addition, the entry of the computer into the field of architecture has contributed to the fact that scaling has become automated. As Michael Tavel Clark and David Wittenberg point out, "CAD tends to privilege architecture freed from its site-contextual considerations" which means "a strange, virtual subversion of Galileo's founding insight that engineering must obey the physical constraints on scale determined by the properties of materials" (Clarke and Wittenberg 2017:16). It is my opinion that this characterizes *MVRDV*'s planning theory and is what Koolhaas sought to thematize, with his considerations of *S,M,L,XL*, but still without paying attention to the fact that the physical nature cannot be scaled. And that lack of attention to nature has, if I may say so, been fatal. It's crucial in architectures contribution to making our world a wasteland.

Points of life – man/architecture/earth system

It is, it seems to me, with attention to the issues listed here and to the fact that they are important for the biodiversity crisis, that Latour–with inspired reference to Tsing–insists that we in every field of knowledge and thus also in fields of knowledge with significance for architecture, acknowledges that many of the problems we face are fostered by upscaling and monocultures. We must recognize that the problems relate to the fact that we have consciously and radically repressed everything that we both in thought and in body experience that we have very limited knowledge of. If we think about it, we know and feel that. And If we actually are about giving up the identification of progress with monocultures and plantations/farms/megacities, it is because we are becoming aware that this way of planning are not only exterminating biodiversity, but also that sorts of life forms develop in these 'capitalist ruins' which is difficult to adapt to: ''The uniformity of crowding of the chickens in effect constitutes a natural laboratory for viruses that produces new and virulent forms. The viruses bred under such condition spread far beyond the chicken farm, potentially infecting humans around the world. Large-scale ecological simplification, then, invite 'feral proliferations' that end up ripling through the entire landscape mosaic" (Tsing 2019:189).

We are connected globally. The Corona virus testifies to that. But we do not live in a world where the local is to be understood as a small dot in the global as cartographic scalability (Google Earth™) and much planning has given us the impression of. We shall be 'relocalicing the global', as Latour states with what he calls a *resert procedure* for modernity (Latour 2016). I'll return to Latour's 'reset procedures'. Latour: "It cannot be said that the small or the short lie within the large or the long, in the sense that the largest or the longest contain them but with just 'fewer details'" (Latour 2017: 94). The local is a reality of its own, where many different life forms meet, and some of them extends beyond, while other move down

below, around of, up above or even into that 'point of life' we focus on, which can for example be a specific tree that isn't scalable. The world we live in is characterized by what Haraway calls "symbiogenesis among lively arts" (Haraway 2016:58-98).

For Latour "one might almost posit as a rule: good artists do not believe in zoom effects" (Latour 2017:94). And one can point out that it is time for that critique of zoom effects to spread among others, including architects, where the critique must be helped along by a renewed dialogue between concepts and drawings, as for example takes place with the *Terra Forma*-project, created in dialogue between a historian of science, Frédérique Aït-Touati, and two architects, Alexandra Arènes and Axelle Grégoire. With a book, the project has presented a series of models (concepts and drawings) that can help us "describing our territory–only, the right way round" (Latour 2021: 69-77), as Latour has called for in his insistence that we must describe the world of life forms starting from something local, alive, non-scalable. With Anna Tsing, one can say that the *Terra Forma*-project has understood that "it is time to turn attention to the non-scalable, not only as objects for description but also as incitement to theory" (Tsing 2015:38).

One of the models in the *Terra Forma* book is called 'point of life': "This model is an attempt to represent the world from an animate body, a living point or 'point of life' (a powerful formulation by Emanuele Coccia), in order to try to sketch a map of active body-spaces" (Aït-Touati 2022:55). When *Terra Forma* mentions a tree as an example of a 'point of life', I think again of Anna Tsing's work and–which I will return to below–of Sverre Fehn's *Nordic Pavilion* in *Giardini* in Venice. Fehn, who was a student of Kahn's, has with his pavilion given measures to a local field around life points, trees. It's indeed worth conceptualizing what Fehn has created to help create attention, and maybe *Terra Forma* can help us in that endeavour? A bit more on Fehn's pavilion in the conclusion of this article.

In *Terra Forma* they write that "one of our best examples of a living being that is anchored in the ground is a tree. (…) If we draw a tree according to [our] guidelines, it will not be miniature, nor a legend, nor a symbol, nor an object, but a point of life: a singular way of unfolding things as they are, in space, with the world around them" (Aït-Touati 2022:58). With Tsing's attention to life that develops in 'capitalist ruins', i.e. around trees in a plantation of monoculture, one experiences that the trees are points for symbiogenetic life that is not planned by man. But if we want to learn about life, which arises and develops in the ruins we ourselves have created, we must consider how we can map and describe this life, which requires work with structures and systems, but in such a way that we let the structures, we map, be informed by sensory experiences: "In contrast to the French tradition, we are interested in structures accessible to the senses. (…) 'Structures' is our analytical word for the form in the world that catches the eye, begs for attention in a phenomenological sense, but also points to longer trajectories. Like the morphologies of trees, which show us historical growth patterns, the structures we identify are signs of landscape-making, a historical process. Landscape structures show history rather than opposing it" (Tsing 2019:188).

If one wants to think further in the field of architecture with this attention, it involves expanding the attention from the duad: 'architecture/man' to the triad: 'architecture/man/earth system', as Jörg Gleiter (Gleiter 2022:75) recently has advocated for under

the influence of the biodiversity crisis. Rather than considering whether there is a proportional concordance between the human body and the building in accordance with universal principles and which we can put on a mathematic formula, one examines–with the involvement of a body that is more than we know–whether we can sense and think relationships that involve more than we had prior been conscious of. Now we investigate what relates to a unique local environment composed of specific and non-scalable life forms–and that we cannot put down to a mathematic formula. We are by purpose for the first time dealing with a local *critical zone* of coexisting life forms were we ourselves exist. We are not outside–there is no outside–but inside this world. Another of Latour's procedures for a *reset of modernity*, "Without the world or within" (Latour 2016), criticizes the perspectival tradition, which has given us the impression that a true gaze looks into the world as if from a place outside, which by its formalized attitude has hindered the understanding that we live in a world of life forms (an 'earth system') with which we–from the inside–have to involve ourselves compositionally.

It is my experience that the attention to this changing of our attention to prioritize the non-scalable earth system–and which is at the same time a localization and an attention to 'symbiogenesis among living forms'–has been in the making for a long time. But it is also my experience that this attention continuously has had to struggle with–and consciously thematize–notions rooted in the Renaissance with (among others) Alberti and in later philosophical aesthetics with (among others) Immanuel Kant. We are continuously forced to deal with the possibility that powerful and skilled persons by reference to tradition can make use of what Haraway has called a 'god trick' (Haraway 1988: 581) from which everything seemingly can be controlled, planned and scaled. It is my experience that these considerations are relevant in relation to the planning of *Lynetteholmen* in Copenhagen; the island seems conceived in a world where only human needs: money, count. I will not argue this further in this context. But I want to point out that the name 'the god trick', suggests that it is an attitude, borne of an alliance with a higher power: market economy, perhaps. And it is by this trick we trough cultural history have been able to imagine that man is the measure of all things, as Alberti–with reference to considerations from antiquity–expressed it in his treatise on perspectival painting: "Since the human figure, of all [objects], is the best known to man, perhaps Protagoras, in saying that man is the model and measure of all thing, meant precisely this: that the incidentals of all [objects] are correctly measured by man's [own] incidentals" (Alberti 2011:18). It is this anthropocentrism that still characterizes Le Corbusiers *Modulor* and as such has dominated the conceptualization of architecture from antiquity to today. For Haraway and her 'situationism' it's about insisting on "the embodied nature of all vision and so reclaim the sensory system that has been used to signify a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze from nowhere" (Haraway 1988:581).

According to Gleiter, anthropocentrism was still thematized and critizized within the duadic horizon: architecture/man by the modernism-critical architectural theory after the Second World War (Gleiter 2022: 59-71). It is only recently that we have become aware that architecture must be thematized with attention also to a non-scalable earth system of which both man and architecture are involved parts. With the duadic privileging of *anthropos*, we are dealing with a kind of blind spot–our own

position: nowhere–which has limited the criticism of the hegemony of the proportion theory which–the criticism of proportion theory–has actually been present both in, for example, Vilhelm Wancher's criticism of his contemporarie's reception of antique architecture in the early 20th Century and in Steen Eiler Rasmussen's later criticism of the theorist Le Corbusier.

Staying in control instead of staying with the trouble

Both Vilhelm Wanscher and Steen Eiler Rasmussen were very skilled at developing our experience of architecture with a parallel creative, conceptual work. They were aware that concepts both directs and create attention. With Wanscher, the conceptual work was even linked to the ambition to establish a norm for the experience of architecture as art. In his youth work *Den æstetiske opfattelse af kunst* (*The aesthetic perception of art*, 1906) he states at the outset–and as a presentation of his endeavor with the text–that his ambition is "to gain certainty that the impression the artworks make on us is the right one." (Wanscher 1963:12). With reference to Kant's philosophical aesthetics, Wanscher points out that "there are other values in art than the artistic ones, which can perhaps be determined personally or historically or theologically" and which could be studied separately. But Wanscher is only interested in conceptualizing "the actual art values; a difference which already Imm. Kant emphasized" (Wanscher 1963:8).

Wanscher is interested in what "is best achieved by studying art practically, just as you would learn any other language" (Wanscher 1963:12). In other words, it is in the dialogue between, on the one hand, a perceiving human being who pays conceptual attention to his sensory experiences, and on the other physical and practical architecture, that Wanscher seeks to conceptualize and articulate the right aesthetic perception of art. Bearing in mind what I stated with Spinoza/Deleuze above, which concerns attention to the fact that the body can do more than we know and thought more than we are conscious of, it is my opinion that *with consciousness* Wanscher seeks to determine the right way of sensing art and architecture. Wanscher is–as already stated–rather interested in articulating a norm than to facilitate an investigation of what we do not yet know. It's therefore my impression that Wancher's attention can be characterized as a 'correlationism', in accordance with Queitin Meillassoux's characterization of Kantian philosophy: "The central notion of modern philosophy since Kant seems to be that of *correlation*. By 'correlation' we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considred apart from the other" (Meillassoux 2008:5). For Wanscher, we are able by this correlation to consciously identify and articulate with concepts the true aesthetic experience of various works of art and architecture. It is my opinion that Wanscher would not actually be dissatisfied with being characterized as a correlating subject, as Timothy Morton–following Meillassoux's characterization–describes the subject working in modern philosophy since Kant: "Correlationism means that there are things in themselves (as Kant would put it), but that they aren't 'realized' until they are correlated by a correlator, in the same way a conductor might 'realize' a piece of music by conducting it. (…) The similarieties between all the 'deciders' is that they are all human. (…) Strong correlationsim is anthropocentric: Any attempt to

include nonhumans is ruled out in advance. The correlator has all the power" (Morton 2017: 9).

Wanscher criticizes the architects of his day for not being aware of the true aesthetic effects of ancient architecture. He points out that "we ourselves carry out aesthetic work when we look at a building" (Wanscher 1963:22). And he states that this is something we have to develop and train, but which the architects of his time do not seem to have understood: "For instead of developing their powers of observation and sense of beauty by immediate studies of the buildings, they place the main emphasis on measuring them geometrically correctly, without regard to the natural optical effects" (Wanscher 1963:22). In Wanscher's words "we forget–what the Italians never forgot, because they were far too influenced by the ancient traditions for that–that a building belongs to the terrain and the space and above all must fill its place in this in a harmonious and balanced way." (Wanscher 1963:22). It is characteristic of Wanscher's aesthetic experience–and the reason why I call him a correlationist interested only in the correspondence between human perception and nature–that he pays attention to nature and thus to what man has not created, but at the same time states: "'Love of nature; a very vague, not to say misleading, concept. You should rather say love for perspective" (Wanscher 1963:76). Wanscher believes that the task of culture is to give form to what is in itself indeterminate and to conceptually confirm this formgiving with an emphasis on the perspective, which has *anthropos* as its focal point. There is an attention to affirm what is more than we can control with mathematical formula, proportioning and the aesthetics of the beautiful, but in the same breath there is an insistence on correlating what we thereby experience with our senses. We stay in full control from a specific *point of view*. We stay a conscious subject and are in full control of our senses instead of staying witht the trouble.

With Jean Francois Lyotard's considerations about Kant's aesthetics and especially the aesthetics of the sublime, one can–with relevance also for Wancher's ambition– point out that Kant and Wanscher are aware of something which turns away from consciousness and which cannot immediately be correlated with forms of rational cognition. They are aware that there are *points of life*, that are not dependent on man. But it's also obvious that both Kant and Wanscher nevertheless seek to control this with a reflexive dialogue with our senses, reestablishing conscious control from a central *point of view*. Lyotard has pointed out that art, following the conceptualization linked to Kant's aesthetics of the sublime, also challenges this correlationism and as such requires a different conceptual dialogue between what we sense and what we think than the one Kant himself payed attention to. In the essay 'After the sublime, the state of Aesthetics', Lyotard asks: 'The paradox of art 'after the sublime' is that it turns towards a thing which does not turn towards the mind. (…) The Thing is not waiting to be destined, it is not waiting for anything, it does not call on the mind. How can the mind situate itself, get in touch with something that withdraws from any relationship?" (Lyotard 1991:142). For me, Wanschers answers this question by insisting on the nowhere that characterizes the conquering gaze of perspective. And this is what Haraway (and others) challenges by making us aware that we bodily experience something, which is *not* controled by our consciousness, and that we must engage with this by an active thinking that precesily acknowledges other attentions than we are conscious of.

For me, we are thus in dialogue with a very central challenge if we want to move from the duad of architecture/man to the triad of architecture/man/earth system, as Gleiter points out. I have already referred to two of Latour's procedures for *reseting modernity*–his insistence that we localize the global, and his critique of the perspective that gives us the impression that we can occupy a position outside the world–and will now highlight *a third reset procedure*, which particularly relates to the conceptual work and which Latour refers to as "Sharing responsibility: Farewell to the sublime" (Latour 1996). For Latour, it seems clear that *both* our visual procedures–which situate our bodies–*and* our thinking and philosophy–which Kant and Wanscher works with–must be at work, since these two fields can *either* cooperate to confirm that we are in conscious and correlative control outside the world (Kant/Wanscher) *or*–with a *parallelism* (Spinoza/Deleuze)–help us move beyond conceited control *from* an abstract point outside where everything is scalable and *into* a non-scalable nature in order to situate what we give measure and compose with nature's unmeasurable qualities.

Conclusion

It is not sufficient to let the human body be the model and measure of everything, as Alberti imagined it (Alberti 2011:18). According to Alberti, everything material should be manipulated and thus adapted to our bodily measures. With Tsing, Latour and others I have argued that nature cannot be scaled, as everything changes with size. We must give measures–scales–to the architecture we create with an understanding *both* of the non-scalable nature *and* of qualities we cannot measure but sense and which we involve in our compositions, such as the play of light and shadow.

Le Corbusier understood that "light and shadow reveal form" and spoke of "the inexpressible space, the apotheosis of plastic emotion" (Le Corbusier 2004:32). One senses what he expresses by experiencing his architecture. But at the same time, Le Corbusier was concerned with putting the forms of architecture–and of the human body–on a mathematical formula, which could testify that the relation between architecture and man rested in rational, mathematical proportions controlled by conciousness. He was fascinated by mathematical thinking and by geometry, and sought to give the impression that every measure in, for example, the *Unité D'habition* (1952) in Marseille, was determined by his system of proportions, the *Modulor*. But it is a misleading guidance, as Steen Eiler Rasmussen has pointed out: The giant columns that support *Unité D'habitation* are not given measure according to the human body, but according to the building they have to suport (Rasmussen 1962:119).

Rasmussen, like Wanscher–to whom Rasmussen refers in the 'personal notes' that are included in the Danish edition of *Experiencing Architecture* (Ramussen 1957:241)–is on the track that measures other than the ones related the human body must be involved when we give measures to a world of diverse life forms with our architecture. But like Wanscher Rasmussen does not let this observation challenge the duad: architecture/man, which–if Gleiter is to be followed–has been the horizon of architectural theory until quite recently. Both Wanscher and Rasmussen are on the track of attentions, which are relevant if we want to land on earth among other forms

of life than humans with our architecture. But their conceptualizations contributes limiting and demarcating rather than expanding and facilitating in relation to that challenge.

It is in this extension that I want to end my reflection with considerations related to Fehn's *Nordic Pavilion* in Venice, which is built around points of life: trees. As the philosopher Arnfinn Bø-Ryg has pointed out, Fehn's pavilion can be considered as an 'art of measuring' insofar as the pavilion, built around points of life that cannot be scaled, provides measures for materials in order to create a field, a space, around the trees with a speciel feeling of light: By virtue of the dimensioning of, among other things, the transverse concrete beams in the roof the sharp, harsh Italian light is filtered and creates in the pavilion the shadowless nordic light that Fehn often spoke of. Bø-Rygg relates in his conceptualizing dialogue with Fehn's pavilion to Martin Heidegger's considerations about dwelling, and writes: "Heidegger calls the space between the earth and sky (or heaven) the 'dimension'. All forms of art and architecture are a means to measure this between, the dimension. To dwell poetically, to create art, is to take measure. 'Is there a measure on earth?' Hölderlin asks. To which he answers: 'There is none.' (…) To measure the dimension is then to dwell in the open, in what Hölderlin calls 'the Unknown'" (Bø-Rygg 2013:232).

It is against this background that Bø-Rygg emphasizes that there is a difference between the architecture that Alberti promoted and which seems to have no real dialogue with the world and nature in which man dwells, and Fehn's architecture, and I will end this text with a longer quote from Bø-Rygg's text: "To make a poem, to take a measure in this way, to scale the dimension, still means designing a building that is essentially 'right'. Alberti defined beauty in this way: that the harmony of all parts in relation to one another, and its part in relation to each other and the whole, must be so that nothing can either be added or taken away, without ruining the wholde. (….) In this way, Fehn's pavilion is surely classical. But what is right in his pavilion is not the harmony between parts or the porportions alone: What Fehn did was to scale the materials, the space, the light, and the shadow to each other. (…) The classical in Fehn's building is just as unexpected as it is inventive" (Bø-Ryg 2013:233).

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